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Abstract. As the capacity of caches increases dramatically with new
processors, soft errors originating in cache memories has become a major
reliability concern for high performance processors. This paper presents
application specic soft error vulnerability analysis in order to under-
stand an application's responses to soft errors from dierent levels of
caches. Based on a high-performance processor simulator called Graphite,
we have implemented a fault injection framework that can selectively in-
ject bit ips to dierent levels of caches. We simulated a wide range of
relevant bit error patterns and measured the applications' vulnerabilities
to bit errors. Our experimental results have shown the diering vulner-
abilities of applications to bit errors in dierent levels of caches (e.g. the
application failure rate for one program is more than the doulbe of that
for another program for a given cache); the results have also indicated
the probabilities of dierent failure behaviors for the given applications.
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1 Introduction
Two trends are observed in the ongoing development of the future generations
of high performance computing systems: 1) the processor is fabricated with the
CMOS processing technology that is constanly scaling down and 2) commodity
high-end processors, rather than customized processors, are more widely em-
ployed to reduce the total cost. The combination of these two trends makes the
reliable working of hardware much more dicult [16]. Unreliable hardware be-
haviors can be roughly split into hard errors and soft errors. While a hard error is
a persistent hardware failure, a soft error is a transient failure and hence harder
to detect and analyze.
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Soft error is a well known reliability concern. However, it is known that appli-
cations have intrinsic masking of soft errors (error rate derating) [12, 14]. Thus
many bit errors are ltered out and are not visible at the application level. To nd
a cost-eective soft error mitigation strategy, it is necessary for system designers
to have fault injection tests in order to obtain a good estimate of application
level soft error rate. How to perform error injection is an important topic in a
computer system reliability analysis. Dierent approaches are developed and can
be roughly grouped into the following categories:
hardware built-in injection These approaches [10] depend on specic units
built into hardwares, usually in the form of Built-In Self-Test. They are only
available in existing hardware.
accelerated hardware emulation These approaches [13, 6] employe a detailed
model of a target hardware, and simulate this model on an accelerator (usu-
ally a FPGA platform). The requirement of a detailed model usually means
this is performed already at a later stage of a design workow.
software based injection These methods [5, 2] run an altered software appli-
cation natively on its target processor. The modications inside the applica-
tion can inject faults to the application visible memory addresses.
simulated hardware based injection These approaches [17] employe a high
level model of a target hardware and simulate this model on a general pur-
pose computer. The high level model is usually less accurate but is easier
to modify in order to model innovative features in a yet to be implemented
processor. This high level model is usually fast enough to test relevant soft-
ware applications and hence to have more application specic estimate of
the eect of faults.
We choose simulated hardware based injection because 1) it has relatively
low development and deployment cost and 2) it provides exibility to explore
novel processor architectures. Thanks to a high performance processor simulator
called Graphite [11], we can eciently simulate an application's responses when
soft error induced bit errors take place in a processor's cache hierarchy.
Previous studies [5, 2] investigated the scientic applications derating ratio
to bit errors from the (o-chip) memory; they did not compare the eects of
soft errors from a multi-level cache hierarchy. However, as its capacity increases
dramatically, cache has become a major source of soft error induced bit errors
on high end processors [1]. To have an accurate estimation of an application's
response to soft errors in cache, it is necessary to have an application's access pat-
terns to dierent levels of caches. However, application cache accesses patterns
are dicult to determine from a static analysis, especially for multi-threading
applications.
In this paper we present a simulation based analysis that can better reveal
realistic cache access patterns. We then perform fault injection directly into the
caches when they are accessed by simulated applications. In this way we can
have the best approximation of the soft error's eect to an application; and can
distinguish this eect from dierent levels of caches.
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In the rest of this paper we rst describe the processor simulator that we used
for fault injection and how we can conduct fault injections in the cache hierarchy
(Section 2); then we present our motivation for various bit error patterns used
in the fault injection (Section 3); next, we describe the experimental process
(Section 4) and present the experimental results (Section 5); we nally discuss
the collected results and draw some conclusions (Section 6).
2 Graphite simulator and bit error injection
We want to obtain the applications response to cache bit errors by directly ob-
serving the simulated results after the fault injection. This simulation should
faithfully execute the target application's instructions; and the error bits are
only injected to the instructions that are accessing the specic cache that we
select for injection during the specied time period. We have chosen a proces-
sor architecture simulator called Graphite developed at MIT [11]; and used the
extensions made by University of Ghent [3] .
2.1 Fast processor simulation
Graphite is a high performance processor simulator. Based on the dynamic in-
strumentation tool called Pin [9], Graphite can directly dynamically re-compile
and execute instructions from the x86 executable binary of a target application.
This feature allows us to easily evaluate scientic applications that are already
compiled for x86 target machines. Also, Graphite can be congured with dier-
ent processor parameters about cache, such as levels, capacities, latencies and
replacement strategies. This is especially true after we applied the extension de-
scribed in [3]. One thing to keep in mind is that Graphite is only for application
space simulation. All system calls in the simulated applications are intercepted
and handled by Graphite. Although these emulated system calls can aect the
insight into OS kernel's responses to fault injection, our experiments are not
greatly aected because we are mainly interested in evaluating scientic com-
puting applications where most processor time is spent in application space.
2.2 Cache error injection
We use a partly modied Graphite that allows us to more exibly congure the
cache hierarchy of a modeled processor. Based on a user dened cache model,
this Graphite simulator can determine for each memory access if it is hit in a
specic cache. If it is a hit, Graphite can also determine which cache line is
accessed.
Our Graphite can read in a separate conguration le with information about
the location and time in the cache hierarchy to insert a bit ip. An illustration
of such a conguration le is shown below.
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...
[fault_injection_model/L3]
start_cycle = 12022450
total_faults_nr = 1
err_bit_nr = 2
multi_byte_upset = false
...
A random conguration generator has been made to generate a large number
of fault injection conguration les. While the injection location and time are
randomized by the generator, the bit error pattern (see Section3) in the congu-
ration les is given as an input to the generator. Because soft error is a rare event
and is unlikely to hit the same application more than once during its execution
with the input size used in our simulation, we only inject one soft error with a
single injection conguration le. One simulation is launched for each individual
fault injection conguration le. During every simulation, the Graphite simula-
tor ips the error bits that are specied in this conguration le providing that
a cache access at the selected cache level takes place during the specied time
period in the conguration le. The injected error bits stay as long as they are
not overwritten or ushed out of the cache.
3 Multiple cell upset and bit error patterns
When processing technology scales down, the probability of Multiple Cell Upset
(MCU) increases dramatically [15, 7]. We simulate the 2-, 4- and 6-cell upsets
which are known to increase in SRAMs and are hard to detect and/or correct
by a conventional ECC mechanism.
Because caches can use physical bit interleaving, A MCU cannot be directly
translated into a Multiple Bit Upset (MBU). Instead, how a MCU is translated
into a MBU depends on the physical bit interleaving implemented in the cache
array. Due to high energy overheads associated with physical bit interleaving in
large cache arrays [8], we only simulated physical bit interleaving for L1 and L2
caches (with dierent degrees of interleaving):
L1(D+I) 4-way interleaving For both L1 data and instruction caches we
assume a 4-way physical bit interleaving. Then the 2-, 4- and 6-cell MCUs
are translated into single bit upset and 2-bit upset in two consecutive bytes.
L2 2-way interleaving For L2 cache the 2-, 4- and 6-cell MCUs are translated
into single bit upset, 2- and 3-bit upset in two consecutive bytes.
L3 no interleaving When no physical bit interleaving is present, the 2-, 4-
and 6-cell MCUs are directly translated into 2-, 4, and 6-bit upset in a single
byte.
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4 Simulation setup
4.1 Applications
We use the SPLASH-2 benchmarks [18] as our applications for the fault injec-
tion simulation. SPLASH-2 benchmarks have a variety of scientic computing
programs that are widely used with processor simulators. Because computa-
tional kernels usually account for the main execution times of scientic com-
putations, we only present the results from three computational kernels from
SPLASH-2 suite in this paper. The selected kernels are a sparse matrix factor-
ization (Cholesky), a fast fast Fourier transform (FFT) and an integer radix sort
(Radix). The problem sizes used for each benchmark are listed in Table 1. All
benchmarks are compiled by GCC in 64-bit mode, with the -O3 optimization.
Table 1. Simulated SPLASH-2 benchmarks and problem sizes
Benchmark Program size
Cholesky tk25.O
FFT 256K points
Radix 256K integers
4.2 Simulation parameters
We simulate our application with a processor model that resembles the Intel
Xeon Dunnington processor (X7460). An X7460 has six cores; each core has
private L1 data and instruction caches (32KB + 32KB). Every two cores share
a L2 cache with the size of 3MB. All cores share a single L3 cache with the size
of 16MB.
Because of the large numbers of cache accesses, it is too expensive to do
an exhaustive fault injection at each cache access during simulation. Hence we
apply statistical sampling techniques to estimate the responses from simulated
applications. Suppose a cache is accessed for X times during the execution, the
total population space for this cache is X. What we need to determine is a sam-
pling size x that is (much) smaller but can still give a reasonable estimation
of the probabilities associated with dierent application responses. For applica-
tions that run for an extended period of time, the cache access numbers are very
large (up to several hundreds of millions for L1 caches). Thus we consider the
application responses follow the normal distribution. Based on the sampling the-
ory [4], and the baseline proling results, we can calculate the sampling number
that we need for each cache is around 500. Such a sampling size can obtain an
error margin less than 5% with a statistical condence interval of 95%. There-
fore, we repeat the fault injection for each individual cache for 500 times (i.e.,
with 500 dierent random fault injection les for each cache when simulating an
application).
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5 Simulation results
We rst prole our target applications by running them on the simulator without
fault injection. These proling results are called baseline results. We use baseline
results 1)to setup the normal execution time for each application and 2) to collect
the correct output if applicable. We repeat each simulation for 10 times and
obtain consistent proling results as shown in Table 2. Note that as a Dunnington
processor has six L1 I/D caches and three L2 caches, the access numbers in the
table are averaged access numbers for each individual L1 and L2 cache. The
total execution cycle is the largest execution cycle number among six cores.
Table 2. Baseline proling information
Benchmark
L1-I cache L1-D cache L2 cache L3 cache Total exec.
accesses accesses accesses accesses cycles
Cholesky 147344731 48832936 1776513 1147177 296651192
FFT 34513627 7581382 368357 572405 54740721
Radix 12408179 1878307 150693 62016 16366277
In the second step we simulate the applications with the randomly generated
fault injection conguration les. We have observed dierent responses from the
simulations with injections. In the rest of this section, we rst describe four
dierent responses caused by fault injections; then we compare the responses
from dierent benchmarks for fault injections from each cache level.
5.1 Application response to fault injections
The four types of responses that we observed from the applications are listed
below. These responses have dierent frequencies in our simulations. We sum-
marize the occuring percentages of each response in the Table 3, 4,5,6. Also, we
compared the vanished fault percentages of all applications in Figure 1. As shown
in this gure, applications have dierent levels of vulnerabilities to injected bit
errors in dierent caches.
fault vanished This is a response in which a target application nishes its
execution successfully.
application crash This is a response in which a target application aborts its
execution. This usually happens with an error return value from the appli-
cation or from the libraries (such as glibc) used by the application. In most
cases the application gets a segmentation fault.
application hang Because each run of simulation for a given application takes
the same input data, and the applications have no intrinsic reasons to show
very dierent execution times, we consider an application becomes a hanging
application if it has been running for three times as long as its baseline
execution time.
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silent data corruption This response is dened as a target application n-
ishes its execution successfully without exceeding three times of its baseline
execution time. But the nal output cannot pass the correctness test. We
only perform the test for FFT in this paper.
Table 3. Applications responses percentages for L1 instruction cache fault injection
simulations; as explained in Section 3, two types of bit error patterns are simulated:
1-bit upset in single byte(SBU1) and 2-bit upset in consecutive bytes(MBU2)
Cholesky FFT Radix
SBU1
Crash 10.5 12.1 11.2
Hang 1.1 1.9 1.5
SDC { 0.1 {
Vanished 88.4 85.9 87.3
MBU2
Crash 10.8 11.6 11.5
Hang 1.2 2.2 1.5
SDC { 0.3 {
Vanished 88.0 85.9 87.0
Table 4. Applications responses percentages for L1 data cache fault injection simula-
tions: 1-bit upset in single byte (SBU1) and 2-bit upset in consecutive bytes (MBU2)
Cholesky FFT Radix
SBU1
Crash 12.1 7.9 5.0
Hang 7.3 4.2 2.2
SDC { 1.5 {
Vanished 80.6 86.4 92.8
MBU2
Crash 16.0 9.0 6.7
Hang 5.2 4.1 2.3
SDC { 1.5 {
Vanished 78.8 85.4 91.0
6 Conclusions
We present a cache fault injection framework based on a fast processor simulator.
Running several scientic computing programs on this simulator with injected
cache bit errors, we have observed various responses from the simulated programs
with dierent probabilities. All programs show that a large percentage of errors
are ltered out and hence invisible at the application level. For the errors that do
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Table 5. Applications responses percentages for L2 cache fault injection simulations;
three types of bit error patterns are simulated: 1-bit upset (MBU1), 2-bit upset (MBU2)
and 3-bit upset (MBU3), all three cases in consecutive bytes
Cholesky FFT Radix
MBU1
Crash 8.1 6.9 8.0
Hang 2.8 1.0 3.0
SDC { 0.5 {
Vanished 89.1 91.6 89.0
MBU2
Crash 9.0 7.5 8.9
Hang 4.2 1.7 4.2
SDC { 0.9 {
Vanished 86.8 89.9 86.9
MBU3
Crash 9.4 7.6 9.5
Hang 4.9 1.9 4.9
SDC { 0.9 {
Vanished 85.7 89.6 85.6
Table 6. Applications responses percentages for L3 cache fault injection simulations;
three types of bit error patterns are simulated: 2-bit upset (SBU2), 4-bit upset (SBU4)
and 6-bit upset (SBU6), all three cases in a single byte
Cholesky FFT Radix
SBU2
Crash 5.0 8.8 4.8
Hang 1.0 3.0 1.1
SDC { 0.7 {
Vanished 94.0 87.5 94.1
SBU4
Crash 5.2 11.4 5.6
Hang 1.3 4.8 1.4
SDC { 1.1 {
Vanished 93.5 82.7 93.0
SBU6
Crash 5.5 13.0 5.7
Hang 1.2 4.9 1.5
SDC { 5.1 {
Vanished 93.3 77.0 92.8
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Fig. 1. Comparison of consolidated percentages of vanished fault for all applications;
vanished fault percentage for each application is the average of its vanished fault per-
centages, assuming each bit error pattern has the same occuring probability
cause an application failure, application crash is the most likely type of failures
(4.8% { 16.0%); while silent data corruption, though relatively rare, is still not
negligible (up to 5.1% for FFT). Moverover, our results indicate that dierent
programs have dierent levels of vulnerability to bit errors injected in dierent
caches (e.g., 6.4% application failures for Cholesky vs. 17.6% for FFT in L3 cache
fault injection simulations). These results suggest that the benets of protecting
an individual cache depends on the application program that is running on this
processor.
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